UIC John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy
Law
Volume 28
Issue 2 Journal of Computer & Information Law
- Winter 2010

Article 4

Winter 2010

Internet Filtering: The Ineffectiveness of WTO Remedies and the
Availability of Alternative Tort Remedies, 28 J. Marshall J.
Computer & Info. L. 273 (2010)
Kristen A. Knapp

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/jitpl
Part of the Computer Law Commons, Internet Law Commons, Science and Technology Law
Commons, Torts Commons, and the Transnational Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Kristen A. Knapp, Internet Filtering: The Ineffectiveness of WTO Remedies and the Availability of
Alternative Tort Remedies, 28 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 273 (2010)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/jitpl/vol28/iss2/4
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in UIC John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy Law by an authorized administrator
of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

\\jciprod01\productn\S\SFT\28-2\SFT204.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

6-JUL-11

14:32

INTERNET FILTERING: THE
INEFFECTIVENESS OF WTO
REMEDIES AND THE AVAILABILITY
OF ALTERNATIVE TORT REMEDIES
KRISTEN A. KNAPP*

I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, Internet filtering, while not a new phenomenon, has
grown both in the United States and across the globe.1 Empirical studies by organizations such as OpenNet Initiative show the pervasiveness
of government filtering is increasing worldwide.2 Governments are no
longer the only actors conducting Internet filtering. Increasingly, private actors, such as Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”), have taken on
filtering responsibilities that require them to act in a quasi-governmental capacity, prompting questions of whether these entities are really private actors or actually agents of the state.3 Internet filtering will only
continue to increase in importance as more nations undertake Internet
filtering and technology improves to facilitate easier and more effective
filtering.4
As a result of these developments, commentators have recently begun to speculate, after the decision by the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”) in United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply
* J.D., Cum Laude, Northwestern University School of Law, 2010; B.A., Wesleyan
University, 2005. I am extremely grateful to Professor Jim Speta for his guidance and
advice during the research and writing process and special thanks to Kevin King for his
encouragement and support.
1. Jonathan Zittrain & John Palfrey, Introduction, in ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE
AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET FILTERING 1, 2 (Ronald Diebert, et al. eds., 2008) (noting
that “[m]ore than three dozen states around the world now filter the Internet”).
2. Mary Rundle & Malcolm Birding, Filtering and the International System: A Question of Commitment, in ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET
FILTERING 73, 90 (Ronald Diebert, et al. eds., 2008).
3. Id. at 76.
4. John G. Palfrey, Preface, in ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL
INTERNET FILTERING ix, ix (Ronald Diebert, et al. eds., 2008).
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of Gambling and Betting Services,5 whether some Internet filtering
might violate WTO commitments under the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (“GATS Agreement”).6 Professor Tim Wu has argued
that China would struggle to justify its restrictive Internet filtering practices under the GATS Agreement.7 China, like the U.S., has made quite
extensive commitments to liberalize services including “data processing
services.”8 The most likely Internet-based services that fall within the
scope of data processing services are search engines. As Wu argues,
China’s Internet filtering in the past has included the outright blocking
of foreign search engines, e.g., the 2002 seizure of Google.com, which
likely violated China’s WTO commitments or at the very least raises substantial questions about the legality of such actions.9 Furthermore, Wu
raises significant questions about China’s ability to justify its filtering
under the commonly cited exception to the GATS Agreement: protection
of public morals and maintenance of public order.10 To justify blocking
foreign search engines, China would be forced to argue that such actions
were necessary to maintain political control within China, in essence attempting to justify a protectionist measure on the basis of its need to
ensure political suppression of dissident views.11
Additionally, in late 2009, the European Centre for International
Political Economy (“ECIPE”) published an extensive study on the state of
Internet censorship and the applicability of international trade law to
Internet filtering. Similarly to Wu, the ECIPE study concluded that
China, among other countries such as Mexico and Germany, who all participate in blocking VoIP services, would struggle to justify its current
5. Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter U.S. –
Gambling Services Appellate Body Report]; Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10,
2004) [hereinafter U.S. – Gambling Services Panel Report].
6. See Tim Wu, Legal Implications of a Rising China: The World Trade Law of Censorship and Internet Filtering, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 263 (2006); Brian Hindley, & Hosuk LeeMakiyama, Protectionism Online: Internet Censorship and International Trade Law, (European Ctr. For Int’l Political Econ., Working Paper No. 12/2009, 2009), available at http://
www.ecipe.org/publications/ecipe-working-papers/protectionism-online-internet-censorship-and-international-trade-law/PDF.
7. Wu, supra note 6, at 265.
8. Id. at 281.
9. Id. at 283-4.
10. General Agreement on Trade in Services art. XIV(a), Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S.
183 [hereinafter GATS Agreement].
11. Wu, supra note 6, at 284 (“. . .WTO panels and Appellate Bodies face the unappetizing prospect of trying to decide when a given part of China’s system of information control represents a measure that combats ‘a genuine and sufficiently serious threat’ that
affects ‘one of the fundamental interests of society.’ ”).
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filtering efforts in light of its GATS Agreement commitments.12 Thus, it
seems clear, or as clear as it can be without an actual WTO case testing
these propositions, that the practices of some nations, particularly
China, fall within the scope of the GATS Agreement and represent violations of the Agreement.
Other commentators, however, argue that the WTO legal agreements that would likely govern any future Internet filtering case are incomplete and ill-suited to the task.13 The “GATS is an incomplete
system. It requires new negotiations to extend it to newer sectors” and
these negotiations have not been entirely forthcoming.14 Moreover, real
concerns remain regarding the ability of the WTO to interpret the GATS
Agreement, an Agreement drafted when the Internet was in its infancy,
in a consistent and meaningful manner given the extensive technological
change that has taken place since the mid-90s.15 Hence, companies doing business on the Internet negatively affected by Internet filtering
practices may be better served by looking beyond the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism, to common law tort doctrines for legal remedies.
Recent technological innovations, particularly a change in the types
of devices accessing the Internet, will make Internet regulation and consequently filtering easier to accomplish in the future. One commentator
has described this evolution as the “appliancization” of the Internet.16
Historically, people accessed the Internet using “generative” devices, but
increasingly, in part because of technological innovation and in part because of consumer demand, people are accessing the Internet with “sterile” devices that are tethered.17 Generative technologies invite tinkering
and innovation, e.g., the PC that can be programmed and reprogrammed
by the user; while sterile technologies come preprogrammed and cannot
be reprogrammed by the user, e.g., cell phones.18 The nature of the
endpoint matters because the more easily a third-party can regulate the
12. Hindley & Lee-Makiyama, supra note 6.
13. See Stuart S. Malawer, Internet Commerce and Trade Policy, VA. LAW. 2 (1999),
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/malawerinternettrade.pdf.
14. Id. at 4.
15. See e.g., Nancy J. King & Kishani Kalupahana, Choosing Between Liberalization
and Regulatory Autonomy under GATS: Implications of U.S. – Gambling for Trade in
Cross Border E-Services, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1189, 1198 (2007) (noting “. . .U.S. –
Gambling also reinforces the uncertainties of a relatively undeveloped GATS legal
framework.”).
16. JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 8 (2008)
(“This counterrevolution would push mainstream users away from a generative Internet
that fosters innovation and disruption, to an appliancized network that incorporates some
of the most powerful features of today’s Internet while greatly limiting its innovative capacity – and, for better or worse, heightening its regulability.”).
17. Id. at 3-8.
18. Id. at 3.
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endpoint the more easily that third-party can filter the Internet.19
The more the Internet becomes appliancized with tethered appliances the more easily third-parties will be able to filter users’ access to
the Internet. Internet filtering is often thought of as merely technical
filtering, or in other words blocking or removing content from websites,
but its definition need not be so narrow. Internet filtering includes any
means of limiting access to the Internet.20 Hence, part of the risk posed
by the appliancization of the Internet is the new ability to “filter” the
Internet by reprogramming the sterile devices at the endpoints that individuals use to access the Internet, at a time when those individuals have
no ability to prevent or undue such reprogramming.21
Appliancization of the Internet contributes to the ease with which
code functions as law because “the software we use shapes and channels
our online behavior as surely as – or even more surely and subtly than –
law itself.”22 As Jonathan Zittrain has noted, “[j]ust as technology’s
functionality defines the universe in which people can operate, it also
defines the range of regulatory options reasonably available to a sovereign”23 and arguably the breadth of mechanisms available for Internet
filtering.
Beyond advances in technology, a change in consumer tastes has
also contributed to the appliancization of the Internet. First, greater
numbers of unsophisticated users began using the Internet as the level
of Internet penetration increased and with these unsophisticated users
came increasing fears of insecurity on the Internet.24 The solution was
to make the means of accessing the Internet less generative and thus
less susceptible to user error.25 Furthermore, the amount of content on
the Internet has increased considerably since the birth of the Internet
and the rate at which new content is produced is starting to have detri19. For an early example of Internet filtering at the endpoints consider Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. May 26, 1995), where Prodigy, an early ISP was held liable for failing to remove defamatory content posted on one of its bulletin boards when Prodigy had held itself out to be
actively monitoring and filtering the content of its bulletin boards.
20. Palfrey, supra note 4, at ix.
21. ZITTRAIN, supra note 16, at 104. For a very recent example, consider the action by
Amazon of removing the George Orwell novels 1984 and Animal Farm from Kindle users’
Kindles without permission or prior notification. See Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Orwell
Books From Kindle, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/technology/companies/18amazon.html.
22. ZITTRAIN, supra note 16, at 104 (agreeing with Lessig and Reidenberg’s theory that
code can be law and applying it to the context of Internet filtering).
23. Id. at 105.
24. Id. at 58.
25. Id. at 59 (noting that this was a particularly common solution in places where the
user did not own the computer, such as schools, offices, libraries and cybercafés).
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mental effects on other aspects of the Internet.26 To make that content
useful to the new generation of Internet consumers it has become imperative to organize the content.27 Consumers have demanded increased
information on the Internet and the more organized consumers demand
the Internet become, the easier it will be for governments or private actors to filter the Internet.28
Second, the rise of Web 2.0 – although seemingly generative because
the user is given considerable ability to determine function, content, and
appearance – is part of the movement toward the appliancization of the
Internet.29 Web 2.0 refers to the time period since approximately 2004,
during which web applications have become increasingly geared toward
interactive content and harnessing the collective creative abilities of Internet users. Web 2.0 content can be created and edited directly by
users, through sites such as social networking sites, video and picture
sharing sites, blogs, and wikis.30 However, Web 2.0 programs are not
truly generative because, although they facilitate the creation of usergenerated content, just as with a common kitchen blender, the user’s options to customize that content are limited. Your kitchen blender might
be able to crush ice to make margaritas, but it cannot julienne potatoes
for the family dinner. Similarly, a blog might allow for a range of content
layouts and a text comment function, but if you want to allow video comments you are not going to be able to use that blog service. Hence, most
Web 2.0 software is nothing more than a dumb appliance that the user
does not have the ability to reprogram to suit the user’s individual
preferences.
This paper addresses two possible legal responses to the rise of Internet filtering. First, the paper argues that U.S. Internet filtering practices generally do not violate U.S. GATS commitments. Rather, the
WTO’s decision in U.S.-Gambling Services was unique and unlikely to be
repeated because (1) the U.S. is predominately an exporter of electronic
services and not an importer, and (2) the U.S.-Gambling Services decision resulted from a denial of market access. Instead, those seeking to
26. Martin Peers, Future Shock for Internet Ads?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2009, at C10,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123483323444195983.html (pointing to the “explosion of user-generated content” as partly responsible for declining ad revenues).
27. JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A
BORDERLESS WORLD 51 (2006) (highlighting the fact that information wants to be grouped,
labeled, and otherwise sorted).
28. Id.
29. ZITTRAIN, supra note 16, at 102.
30. Tim O’Reilly & John Battelle, Web Squared: Web 2.0 Five Years On, WEB 2.0 SUMMIT, (2009), http://assets.en.oreilly.com/1/event/28/web2009_websquared-whitepaper.pdf
(noting Tim O’Reilly coined the term Web 2.0 in a conference in 2004, unsurprisingly titled
Web 2.0 Conference).
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impose legal liability for U.S. filtering practices should pursue tort remedies, specifically for tortious interference in contractual relations.
Part II provides technical background on how Internet filtering is
accomplished in practice, including the range of types and methods of
Internet filtering. It also explores how the actors responsible for Internet filters are shifting. Part III details the GATS Agreement that was
held to govern Internet filtering in the U.S.-Gambling Services decision
and would likely govern other filtering actions, including both the exceptions to this regime and why the U.S.-Gambling Services decision is unlikely to affect future U.S. filtering efforts. In Part IV the paper surveys
the current range of U.S. Internet filtering actions and why these actions
are unlikely to violate WTO GATS commitments.
Part V details how tort remedies, such as those available for the intentional interference in contractual relations and at-will relationships
are likely to be better legal remedies than WTO law for companies affected by U.S. Internet filtering actions. Although there are only a limited number of cases that have applied the tort of intentional
interference in contractual relations in the Internet context, those precedents suggest plaintiffs can recover provided they establish that the filtering was both intentional and improper.31 The outlook is similarly
positive for at-will relationships, which require proof of similar elements
as contractual relationships.32 Part VI briefly concludes.
II. HOW DO GOVERNMENTS AND PRIVATE ACTORS
FILTER THE INTERNET?
Internet filtering is not simply the blocking of content by the government or a private actor; Internet filtering encompasses content restrictions as well as licensing requirements, legal liability regimes,
registration requirements, and methods that promote self-monitoring by
Internet users.33 Nor is Internet filtering uniform in terms of the manner in which it is conducted or the location at which it takes place in the
Internet’s physical architecture. The kind of Internet filtering attempted
varies with the motivations of the filtering group and the group’s capabilities and resources available to conduct Internet filtering.34 The actors responsible for Internet filtering have also begun to change.
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §766 (1979).
32. See Vulcan Golf, LLC v. Google, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 2d 752 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (denying
defendant’s motion to dismiss).
33. Jonathan Zittrain & John Palfrey, The Politics & Mechanisms of Control, in ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET FILTERING 29, 32-33 (Ronald
Diebert, et al. eds., 2008).
34. Steven J. Murdock & Ross Anderson, Tools and Technology of Internet Filtering, in
ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET FILTERING 57, 58-59 (Ronald Diebert et al. eds., 2008).
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Governments are increasingly relying on private actors, such as ISPs
and other intermediaries, to conduct Internet filtering, complicating the
imposition of liability on those actors.
A. PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE

OF THE

INTERNET

The Internet relies on a physical architecture to deliver content to
users. That architecture is comprised of several pieces. At one end there
is the user at a computer or, as is often the case now, a cell phone,
iTouch, iPad, or eBook reader. Second, the inner workings of the Internet control the user’s ability to access content. The inner workings
can be divided into two parts: (1) DNS servers and (2) routers. Internet
filtering can take place at both the DNS server location and at the router
location.
The DNS server allows the user, who has typed in a domain name or
URL, such as www.google.com, to find the IP address for that domain
name. Once the IP address is determined, the user’s computer, connecting via a router, is able to find the computer on the Internet that hosts
the desired website.35 The router’s job is particularly important and
more commonly the locus of Internet filtering efforts than at the DNS
server phase.36 The router receives information, called packets, from
both the user’s computer and information located on other computers on
the Internet and determines how to send the information to its destination.37 Once the router directs the information, the requested web page
is loaded on the user’s Internet device allowing the user to view it.38 The
packets that the router receives are uniform to the extent that they all
rely on the TCP/IP protocol to encode the information they contain, thus
explaining how the different routers on the Internet are able to communicate with one another.39
B. TYPES

OF

FILTERING

Content filtering operates by disrupting the physical architecture of
the Internet at some phase in the transmission of either (1) the request
to locate the IP address or (2) the process of loading the website onto the
35. Id. at 57-58.
36. Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. REV. 653, 658 (2003)
(“Routing is critical because the phase at which control is attempted is one of the most
important factors contributing to a given control strategy’s strengths and shortcomings as
matters of both engineering and policy.”). See also Robert E. Kahn and Vinton G. Cerf,
What is the Internet (And What Makes it Work)? (Dec. 1999), http://www.policyscience.net/
cerf.pdf (describing routers as a “key architectural construct”).
37. Murdock & Anderson, supra note 34, at 57.
38. Id. at 57-58.
39. Id. at 57.
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user’s Internet device so the user can view the website.40 An in depth
discussion of the technical methods of carrying out content filtering is
beyond the scope of this paper, but it is important to highlight the difference between three kinds of content filtering: DNS tampering, TCP/IP
header filtering, and TCP/IP content filtering.
DNS tampering occurs during a request to locate an IP address.
Typically it works by giving the ISP’s DNS server a list of blocked IP
addresses. When the user’s computer requests the blocked IP address an
erroneous answer or no answer is returned.41 TCP/IP header filtering
operates by looking at the IP address information contained in each
packet of information. Using a block list,42 a router can be configured to
drop packets headed to IP addresses on the block list.43 In contrast to
TCP/IP header filtering, TCP/IP content filtering is more invasive and
more likely to be accurate. TCP/IP content filtering involves inspecting
the actual content of the packet, rather than just its address information,
to determine whether the content contains banned keywords.44 This
kind of filtering, while being even more accurate, has the drawback of
potentially being more expensive as additional equipment may be
necessary.45
Licensing requirements, although seemingly neutral, may be an increasingly popular means of filtering, especially if one believes Zittrain’s
“appliancization” of the Internet argument. Licensing requirements target the Internet’s growing cadre of intermediaries and require them to
carry out Internet filtering.46 The most studied licensing requirement in
the U.S. that imposes Internet filtering requirements is the Federal
Communication Commission’s (“FCC”) implementation of the Children’s
Internet Protection Act (“CIPA”).47 CIPA requires schools and libraries
wishing to receive discounts offered by the E-rate program to certify that
they have an “Internet safety policy that includes technology protection
measures. The protection measures must block or filter Internet access
to pictures that are: (a) obscene, (b) child pornography, or (c) harmful to
minors (for computers that are accessed by minors).”48
Even in the absence of a licensing requirement, the government can
40. Id. at 57-58.
41. Id. at 60-61
42. Block lists are discussed infra in Section IIB.
43. Murdoch & Anderson, supra note 34, at 57-58.
44. Id. at 59.
45. Id. at 59-60. There are also other technical problems associated with TCP/IP content filtering, stemming from the fact that an entire communication may be split over several packets, making the job of filtering more complex. Id.
46. Zittrain & Palfrey, supra note 1, at 32-33.
47. Children’s Internet Protection Act, 20 U.S.C. § 9134 (2010) [hereinafter CIPA].
48. Children’s Internet Protection Act, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/
consumerfacts/cipa.html (last visited April 1, 2011).
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ensure filtering takes place through the imposition of liability on ISPs.49
Registration requirements facilitate government’s gathering information
about those using the Internet, including IP addresses visited and the
location from which the Internet was accessed. Finally, governments
often take steps to encourage self-monitoring by Internet users. Encouraging self-monitoring most often happens as a result of publishing information regarding online surveillance programs.50
C. PHYSICAL LOCATION

OF

FILTERING

The choice of where to filter is no longer an easy decision, as most
states do not fully control access to the Internet or directly control the
ISPs that provide access to the Internet.51 Thus, these states may be
forced to rely on private or semi-private ISPs to conduct blocking on the
State’s behalf.52 Common loci of Internet filtering include the source of
the offending content, the ISP responsible for supplying the offending
content, the destination or user’s computer, and the destination ISP.53
Targeting the source of the offending content can be particularly effective as the source is “almost always most clearly and directly legally
responsible for” distribution.54 However, targeting the source creates
two problems. First, the individual or corporation that owns the source
of the offending content may be difficult to determine.55 Second, if the
source is not located within the geographic territory of the filtering state
it can be difficult to change their behavior. Another related option is to
target the ISP for the source of the offending content. From the perspective of enforcement this option may be more effective because “it may be
easier to find and engage an ISP regarding its legal responsibilities than
a single subscriber of that ISP.”56 However, this means of filtering the
offending content does not resolve the second problem, because the ISP
may be located abroad.57
49. See Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c) (2010) (providing
immunity for interactive computer service providers who are not information content providers of offensive material).
50. Zittrain & Palfrey, supra note 1, at 33.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Zittrain, supra note 36, at 659-73.
54. Id. at 659.
55. Id. at 662.
56. Id. at 669.
57. See e.g., David Post, The Iceland of the Internet, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 8,
2010), http://volokh.com/2010/01/08/the-iceland-of-the-internet (commenting that a small
movement of people are interested in establishing Iceland as “a jurisdictional ‘safe haven’
for information on the global network” with “a set of highly-protective laws for anonymity
protection, free expression, immunities for information providers, and the like for those
who make information available on the net.”).
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Second, a government could try to target the destination or the destination ISP. Filtering at the destination has the potential to be very
effective, as seen through the FCC’s implementation of CIPA. In the
U.S., however, even these modest efforts have met significant First
Amendment challenges “grounded largely in filtering software’s inaccurate categorization and therefore overbroad blocking of Web sites.”58
Consequently, filtering at the destination remains problematic unless
there are sympathetic or controlled third-party owners of the computers,
as in the library and school setting.59 Filtering at the destination might
become significantly more appealing and feasible if the devices used to
connect to the Internet become increasingly subject to the control of
third-parties, as in the case of cell phones and telecommunications companies, who have a vested interest in staying in the FCC’s good graces,
even at the expense of consumer preferences.60
Filtering at the destination ISP is perhaps the most fruitful of all the
four points of control, despite not being widely used in the U.S. Destination ISPs are by their very nature local. Furthermore, the proper incentives for ISPs to conform their behavior to the legal regime of the
destination country are already in place.61 Finally, destination ISPs
would be comparatively easy to control because a relatively small number of ISPs provide the vast majority of Internet users with access to the
Internet.62 Because of these advantages, controlling the destination
ISPs “has been the approach of governments that wish to control the flow
of content over the Internet but who cannot project that control beyond
their boundaries.”63
D. ACTORS INVOLVED

IN

INTERNET FILTERING

Contrary to popular understanding, and wishes from the 1990s, the
Internet has not eliminated the need for intermediaries. There is not
now and nor is there ever likely to be a global community where individuals interact directly without the need for intermediaries.64 Instead, the
world has witnessed a transformation of the identity of the intermediaries and they have grown in number and importance. Today,
58. Zittrain, supra note 36, at 670.
59. Id. at 671.
60. Id. Zittrain points to the example of digital rights management initiatives seeking
to design computers “that inherently manage content according to publishers’, rather than
users, wishes.” Id. One could imagine a world in which cell phone carriers or manufactures moved in this direction. Id.
61. Id. at 673.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 27, at 71 (noting that local intermediaries “are a
defining, and therefore ineliminable, aspect of the Internet.”).
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the Internet relies on ISPs, search engines, browsers, manufacturers of
physical network components such as servers and routers, and financial
intermediaries to function.65 Notably, the vast majority, if not all, of
these intermediaries are private actors.
These intermediaries have become both capable of filtering the Internet and the targets of Internet filtering pressure. Intermediaries,
such as destination ISPs, discussed above, are a good target for government pressure because they too are local by definition. The presence of
local intermediaries allow governments to “affect[ ] Internet flows within
their borders even though they originate abroad and cannot easily be
stopped at the border.”66
The most prominent and likely future filterers of the Internet are
ISPs and software companies. First, ISPs are likely to be a key player
because of the potential power they can wield when filtering the Internet
as nations like Saudi Arabia and China have shown. Furthermore, as
previously noted, destination ISPs are local and thus easily controlled
through traditional methods of government regulation. However, recent
events have shown limitations exist regarding the amount of pressure
nations can place on intermediaries to filter content. In late March 2010,
Google decided to leave China completely and relocate to Hong Kong after Google was reportedly hacked by individuals who were trying to spy
on Chinese dissidents.67 Traffic from the Google China site, google.cn,
was redirected to the Google Hong Kong site, google.com.hk, and Google
will no longer censor the search results it generates.68 In a similar
move, GoDaddy.com, the largest domain service, announced it would not
register new domain names in China.69 Despite these powerful statements by Google and GoDaddy.com, other U.S. companies with a strong
Internet presence, such as Microsoft and Yahoo!, have not left the Chinese market.70
Second, a growing trend among states that conduct state-mandated
Internet filtering is to employ the services of commercial software companies who help develop and implement block lists.71 These services
work by generating lists of IP addresses or URLs, using proprietary
65. Id. at 70.
66. Id. at 68.
67. Google Taking a Lonely Stand Against China, CHICAGO DAILY HERALD, Mar.31,
2010, at 12.
68. Editorial, Google and China, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/03/24/opinion/24wed2.html?ref=todayspaper.
69. Tony Romm, World’s Top Domain Name Service to Stop Offering Web Addresses in
China, THE HILL, (Mar. 24, 2010, 12:45 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/88843-worlds-top-domain-name-service-to-stop-offering-web-addresses-in-china.
70. Google Taking a Lonely Stand Against China, supra note 67.
71. Zittrain & Palfrey, supra note 33, at 38. (noting that U.S.-based Secure Computing’s SmartFilter, Websense and Fortinet appear to assist in Internet filtering abroad).
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methods, related to topics such as pornography or drugs, that will be
blocked if the state uses their services.72 These lists can also be tailored
by the state purchasing the service. Thus, if a state purchases a block
list related to religion, the state can tailor the list to reflect its particular
ideological preferences.73
Beyond the manufacture of filtering programs, software companies
create the programs that allow Zittrain’s “appliancized” devices to access
the Internet. Software companies possess the power to reprogram these
devices without the consent of their users. Consequently, the software
companies will have the capacity to control the manner in which users
experience the Internet, including the content they are able to access.
E. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED

WITH

INTERNET FILTERING

Internet filtering conducted by the use of IP and URL block lists is
usually simultaneously overbroad and under inclusive. At the very least,
it suffers from one of these two problems.74 This lack of precision usually flows from a simple lack of resources. Although some commentators
argue that “Internet filtering is almost impossible to accomplish with
any degree of precision,”75 the real roadblock is not lack of technological
means but rather lack of affordable technology. Countries face a choice
between using internally developed filtering software or purchasing
software from commercial manufacturers. Due to the sheer size of the
Internet and the difficulty associated with creating and updating block
lists,76 many states purchase blocking software.
The blocking lists, whether based on URLs or IP addresses, themselves are imperfect methods. Blocking based on IP addresses is particularly susceptible to the criticism that it is overbroad because it blocks
everything at a given IP address rather than distinguishing between permissible and impermissible content.77 For example, Spain blocked the
entire IP address associated with the terra.es domain, when only one
page hosted on that domain had offending content.78 Furthermore, IP
addresses are not entirely static. From time to time, IP addresses are
reassigned and, unless the blocking list is updated, innocuous content
may be blocked.79 Blocking based on URL address faces much the same
72. Id.
73. Id. at 38-39.
74. Id. at 46.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 38. (noting that the task of Internet filtering is further complicated when
sites realize they are the target of blocking attempts and attempt to thwart the blocking by
changing their URL addresses).
77. Id. at 46.
78. Zittrain, supra note 36, at 653.
79. Id.
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problem. Notably, URL blocking is even more resource intensive than IP
address blocking and thus it is used primarily in Saudi Arabia and
China.80 One problem likely to grow in importance is the blocking of
blogs. Individual blogs hosted by a service all have similar URL addresses so countries are forced to either block blogs individually, which is
resource-intensive, or to block the entire blog service at the URL level,
i.e. blocking all of http://freespace.virgin.net as Saudi Arabia was doing,
as of 2004.81
The lack of affordable technological means to conduct Internet filtering also causes under inclusive Internet filtering. As noted previously,
the manufacturers of blocking list technology are American companies.
Thus, their programs tend to target more English language websites
rather than websites in the local language, where the latter generally
cause more concern for states electing to filter the Internet.82 This potentially results in under inclusive blocking where impermissible content
available in English is blocked but the same content written in the local
language is freely accessible.83 Furthermore, Internet filtering need not
be “be completely effective to be adequately effective.”84 Goldsmith and
Wu explain, and Zittrain seemingly would agree, filtering efforts need
only make it sufficiently difficult that the majority of users will not attempt to access a given website.85 Nonetheless, OpenNet Initiative has
found that the overall trend is towards an increase in Internet filtering
and an increase in the number of methods employed to achieve Internet
filtering goals.86
III. WTO COMMITMENTS GOVERNING INTERNET FILTERING
The GATS Agreement, specifically Articles XIV and XVI, in combination with an individual country’s Schedule of market access commitments, provides the basic legal text governing commitments applicable
to the Internet and e-commerce. When the WTO Agreements were
drafted there was no Internet as we know it today. Thus none of the
WTOs legal instruments, including the GATS Agreement were drafted
with the Internet in mind. As a result, it is quite challenging to stretch
these agreements to cover the Internet, while ensuring they are inter80. Id.
81. Zittrain & Palfrey, supra note 33, at 47.
82. Id. at 38-39. (citing as an example the UAE decision to block English-language
dating sites but no Arabic-language dating sites).
83. Id. at 39.
84. GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 27, at 67.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 41-43 (noting “an increase in alternative modes of filtering, both in engineering techniques and through increased licensing, registration, and reporting requirements
in some states.”).
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preted in a consistent and meaningful fashion. The U.S.-Gambling Services case was the first, and remains the only case, to attempt to apply
the GATS Agreement rules in the context of an Internet service. As a
result, predicting how the GATS Agreement will be interpreted to apply
to Internet filtering cases is challenging. Such interpretation raises
questions of whether products delivered via the Internet should be classified as goods or services. If classified as services, what Mode (method
of supplying the service) the service falls within must also be determined
as it has the potential to affect the national law governing the transaction. While the U.S.-Gambling Services decision clarified many of these
points, areas of uncertainty remain.
A. GATS AGREEMENT
The GATS Agreement, covering trade in services, is one of the treaties comprising the WTO’s legal framework. The GATS Agreement sets
specific rules regarding market access barriers, which are typically tariffs and non-tariff barriers that impede entry into a given market, and
their gradual reduction. These rules do not prohibit market access barriers, but rather prohibit a WTO Member from affording other Members
treatment less favorable “than that provided for under the terms, limitations and conditions agreed and specified in its Schedule.”87 Thus, Member countries agree to certain market access commitments, in a bottomup rather than top-down fashion, and those commitments are memorialized in the country’s Schedule.
GATS commitments are made in specific sectors and based on a specific mode of delivery. WTO members can make commitments in twelve
broad sectors: business services, communication services, construction
and related engineering services, distribution services, educational services, environmental services, financial services, health-related and social services, tourism and travel-related services, recreational, cultural
and sporting services, transport services, and other services.88 Each sector is divided into subsectors. The sectors that are most important to a
discussion of e-commerce or electronically supplied services are (listed as
broad service – subsector): business services - computer and related services; communication services - value-added telecommunications services; recreational, cultural and sporting services - entertainment
services (section under which gambling services were held to fall in U.S.Gambling Services decision);89 and communication services - audiovisual
87. General Agreement on Trade in Services art. XVI, para 1, art. XIV(a), Apr. 15,
1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183.
88. PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 485 (2d ed. 2008).
89. U.S. – Gambling Services Appellate Body Report, paras.162 – 168.
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services.90
Second, commitments are made in one of four modes. The four
modes of supply are: cross-border supply (Mode 1); consumption abroad
(Mode 2); supply through commercial presence (Mode 3); and supply
through presence of national persons (Mode 4).91 Under the GATS
Agreement nations are permitted to make different commitments in
each of the modes of supply.
B. EXCEPTIONS

TO THE

GATS AGREEMENT

The GATS Agreement permits countries to deviate from their Schedule of market access commitments to protect (1) public morals and order,
(2) human or animal welfare, (3) or to ensure compliance with domestic
laws not inconsistent with the GATS Agreement. Specifically, Article
XIV of the GATS Agreement provides:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services, nothing in this Agreement shall
be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member of
measures:
a. necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order;
b. necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
c. necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement including those related to:
i. the prevention of deceptive and fraudulent practices or to
deal with the effects of a default on services contracts;
ii. the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the
processing and dissemination of personal data and the protection of confidentiality of individual records and accounts;
iii. safety;
d. inconsistent with Article XVII, provided that the difference in
treatment is aimed at ensuring equitable or effective imposition
of direct taxes in respect of services or service suppliers of other
Members;
e. inconsistent with Article II, provided that the difference in treatment is the result of an agreement on the avoidance of double
taxation or provisions on the avoidance of double taxation in any
other international agreement or arrangement by which the
Member is bound.

Article XIV has been interpreted to require satisfaction of a two-tier
test to justify otherwise GATS inconsistent measures. In the U.S.-Gam90. SACHA WUNSCH-VINCENT, THE WTO, THE INTERNET
EC-US PERSPECTIVES, 68 (2006).
91. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 88, at 486-87.

UCTS:

AND

TRADE

IN

DIGITAL PROD-
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bling Services decision, the Appellate Body said that it would first look to
see “whether this measure can provisionally be justified under one of the
specific exceptions under paragraphs (a) to (e) of Article XIV.”92 If so,
the Appellate Body will see “whether the application of this measure
meets the requirements of the chapeau of Article XIV.”93 The chapeau94
of Article XIV forbids the challenged measure from being applied in a
discriminatory manner, even if it is otherwise compliant with an exception specified in paragraph (a) - (e). For example, if certain filtering were
needed to protect public morality, but was applied so as to block content
from England but not France, that measure would not constitute a valid
exception to a nation’s market access commitments because it would fail
to satisfy the requirements of the chapeau.
The exception most likely to apply to the e-commerce and electronically supplied services context, and the one encountered in the U.S.Gambling Services case, is for the protection of public morals and maintenance of public order.95 This exception, along with the exceptions in
paragraphs (b) and (c) imposes a further consideration. For a measure
under paragraph (a) – (c) to be provisionally justified it must be necessary to achieve the policy objective pursued.96
The necessity of an otherwise impermissible measure is in turn measured by a two-tiered test. In particular, Article XIV(a) requires that to
be provisionally justified the invoking Member must show that: “the policy objective pursued by the measure at issue is the protection of public
morals or the maintenance of public order; and the measure is necessary
to fulfill that policy objective.”97 A full discussion of how this requirement was interpreted by the Appellate Body in U.S. –Gambling Services
and how it might apply to future Internet filtering cases is provided in
Part IV.
C. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH APPLYING THE WTO GATS
COMMITMENTS TO E-SERVICES
At the time the GATS Agreement was drafted, between 1986 and
1994,98 the Internet as we know it did not exist. The Internet that did
92. Id. at 654.
93. Id.
94. The chapeau, French for hat, refers to the first sentence of Article XIV that precedes paragraphs (a) – (e).
95. General Agreement on Trade in Services art. XIV(a), Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S.
183(a).
96. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 88, at 654 (2d ed. 2008).
97. Id. at 655.
98. See generally Taunya L. McLarty, Liberalised Telecommunications Trade in the
WTO: Implications for Universal Service Policy, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 13-18 (1998). The
1986 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round paved the way for the trade in service
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exist did not involve the extensive cross-border trade in services but
rather was a collection of nascent and largely independent ISPs serving
distinctive constituencies.99 As a result, the legal structure of the GATS
Agreement is not particularly suitable to govern e-commerce and electronically supplied services.100
The first problem stems from trying to decide whether e-commerce
and electronically supplied services should fall within the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (“GATT”), which applies to trade in
goods only, or the GATS Agreement. This initial problem is tricky because e-commerce is nothing more than content on a carrier medium that
can now be downloaded on the Internet.101 For example, a recording artist can supply music either in a brick and mortar store on a CD or can
elect to use iTunes. In both cases the item being supplied is music, arguably a good. Should making that good available for download on the
Internet make it a service rather than a good? Nowhere in the WTO
legal regime is there a clear definition of what constitutes a good versus
what constitutes a service.102
The best view is that e-commerce should be classified as services
rather than goods. The first argument, initially advanced by the EU, is
that the GATT Agreement was never designed to cover “information
digitised [sic] into bits and sent across a border through a telecommunications network.”103 The EU further argued that such content has always been considered as computer or audiovisual services and thus
subject to the GATS Agreement.104
Second, the WTO does not provide for a rule guaranteeing technological neutrality between the GATS and the GATT.105 In other words, the
same good need not be treated similarly when it is transmitted over different media. In fact, the GATS Agreement itself enshrines unequal
negotiations. Id. Negotiations concluded in 1994, after the U.S. recommendation was accepted, dividing services into six parts. Id.
99. For example, Compuserve, which was more business and technically focused, and
Prodigy, which marketed itself as family-oriented.
100. See WUNSCH-VINCENT, supra note 91, at 71 (2006) (noting that “most of the digital
content services . . . are inseparable combinations of telecommunications, software and audiovisual services that rely on commitments on these content services themselves and their
digital transmission”).
101. Id. at 48.
102. Id. at 49.
103. Id. at 56 (citing GC, Submission for the EC, Classification Issues and the Work
Programme on E-Commerce, WT/GC/W/497 (9 May 2003) para. 7).
104. Id. at 56.
105. Id. at 56 (noting “the likeness of products between content being exported on physical carrier media and content delivered electronically does not imply an obligation to afford
identical trade treatment.”).
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treatment by allowing for different commitments across the four different modes of supply.
Finally, legal certainty is increased and economy of resources promoted if a GATS Agreement rather than a GATT classification is used.
The EU has argued that if electronic deliveries are classified in accordance with their “physical equivalent under the GATT, many physical
outcomes (e.g., blueprints) that result from services (e.g., architectural,
consulting services) hitherto clearly targeted by the GATS would have to
be considered under the GATT,” resulting in a significant re-classification of otherwise already classified services.106 Thus, one of the advantages of using a GATS classification is avoiding the re-classification
negotiations that would be required.107
The second problem commonly associated with the extension of
GATS classifications to e-commerce and electronically delivered services
is whether such services should be considered Mode 1 or Mode 2 services.
The Mode classification is relevant because the extent of liberalization
undertaken in each of the Modes varies. Typically, commitments made
under Mode 2 are more liberal than commitments made under Mode
1.108 However, increasingly nations are making commitments that are
the same across Modes 1 and 2.109
The question of whether e-commerce and electronically traded services should be classified under Mode 1 or Mode 2 turns on “whether the
service is produced abroad and sent across borders to a foreign consumer
or whether it is the consumer who ‘travels’ abroad to consume a service.”110 However, in the context of e-commerce this definition is hard to
apply. Consider the circumstance of the service that is produced abroad
and hosted on a server abroad. That service still could be considered to
be sent across a border because the service is accessible from within the
territory of a foreign country. Hence, it could be classified as a Mode 1
service. Conversely, one might say that the service does not cross the
border of another country because it is not hosted on a server within that
country. Instead, the consumer ‘travels’ to the server located abroad.
Under this understanding the service would more properly be classified
as a Mode 2 service.
One suggested resolution of this definitional problem is to focus on
whether the service provider actively approaches the consumer, which
would be Mode 1, or whether the consumer approaches the provider
106. WUNSCH-VINCENT, supra note 91, at 59.
107. Id. at 60.
108. Id. at 67.
109. Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, The Internet, Cross-Border Trade in Services and the
GATS: Lessons from US-Gambling, 3 WORLD TRADE REV. 319, 324 (2006).
110. WUNSCH-VINCENT, supra note 91, at 65 (citing Article I, para 2 of the GATS
Agreement).
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through a visit to a website, which would be Mode 2.111 This solution,
however, leaves much to be desired. The service provider could solicit
the customer over a different media, such as television, and request that
the customer visit his website. What modal classification would be appropriate under this scenario? Another solution would be to classify ecommerce as the predecessors of e-commerce, telephone and fax services,
were classified. Historically, telephone and fax services were classified
as Mode 1.112
A third problem, arising from the uncertainty surrounding the classification of e-services, is the jurisdictional questions that different modal classifications might raise. The basic question in the case of eservices is which national legal system should govern a cross-border
transaction: the country of the supplier or the country of the consumer?113 Some commentators have argued that modal classification
answers this debate, while others argue that modal classification does
not have a jurisdictional implication.114 If modal classification were determinative, Mode 1 would secure the primacy of the consumer’s locality
because the business transaction would be deemed to have occurred in
the consumer’s locality.115 Conversely, Mode 2 would implicate the legal
system of the supplier’s locality as the prevailing law.116
D. THE WTO U.S.-GAMBLING SERVICES DECISION
The U.S.-Gambling Services decision remains the only WTO decision regarding the provision of Internet services and the only decision
directly applicable to a discussion of how the WTO legal regime could be
applied to Internet filtering. It is a landmark decision because it confirms two basic facts that are crucial to a complete discussion of how
GATS commitments would apply to future Internet filtering cases. First,
the U.S.-Gambling Services decision confirms that WTO GATS commitments are applicable to e-commerce and electronically supplied services.117 Second, the U.S.-Gambling Services decision clarified that ecommerce and electronically supplied services will be treated under
Mode 1, and not Mode 2.118
111. Id. at 66.
112. Id. at 67.
113. Id. at 68. Although historically there has been some question regarding whether it
was even possible to identify the country of the supplier, the increased availability and
affordability of geolocation technologies has largely quashed this concern.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. WUNSCH-VINCENT, supra note 109, at 3.
118. WUNSCH-VINCENT, supra note 90, at 175.
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The first part of the decision was largely expected and the decision
did nothing more than confirm the general understanding of academics:
that e-commerce and electronically delivered services are governed by
the GATS Agreement. Given the time that has passed since the decision
and the general academic consensus on this issue, it seems unlikely that
the WTO would retreat from the decision.
However, the second clarification, regarding the decision to treat ecommerce and electronically supplied services as Mode 1, was not as expected. Nonetheless, the WTO Appellate Body, in concluding that e-commerce and e-services are governed by Mode 1, has done nothing more
than national courts have in terms of trying to solve this thorny
question.
If one believes that modal classification has jurisdictional effects,
then a Mode 1 classification would mean that the law of the consumer’s
locality should prevail in debates over the appropriateness of Internet
content. Domestic courts have previously reached just this conclusion.
In April of 2000, La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme
(“LICRA”), filed suit in French court against Yahoo objecting to Yahoo’s
presentation of Nazi memorabilia for sale on its websites, in violation of
French law.119 The French court issued an order on May 22 that in essence required Yahoo to stop this content from being viewable by users
from within France.120 The significance of this order is that it shows
that French courts, as early as mid-2000, believed they had the right to
control Internet content being projected into their country, just as the
WTO reaffirmed with its classification of e-services as Mode 1 rather
than Mode 2.
Other European courts have similarly held that foreign owned and
operated websites are required to follow national laws, if their websites
are viewable inside that country. For example, in 2000, the Bundesgerichthof, Germany’s highest court, held that an Australian website was
required to follow German anti-Nazi speech and Holocaust laws.121 An
Australian national had posted Holocaust revisionist material on his
website and the Bundesgerichthof ordered its removal.122 Italian courts
have also held that Italian libel laws apply to all online content viewable
in Italy.123
119. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1201-1203 (9th Cir.
2006).
120. Id. at 1202-03.
121. Mahasti Razavi & Thaima Samman, Yahoo! and Limitations of the Global Village,
19 COMM. LAW. 27, 28 (2001).
122. Julie L. Henn, Note, Targeting Transnational Internet Content Regulation, 21 B.U.
INT’L L.J. 157, 171 (2003).
123. Razavi & Samman, supra note 121, at 28.
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IV. U.S. INTERNET FILTERING EFFORTS AND WHY THEY ARE
UNLIKELY TO VIOLATE WTO GATS COMMITMENTS
The U.S. government is not engaged in extensive Internet filtering,
but rather has chosen to concentrate its filtering efforts in areas that fall
well within the accepted GATS Agreement morality and public order exceptions. The prime and perhaps only example of U.S. governmental filtering is conducted pursuant to CIPA through the FCC’s implementation
of the E-rate program.124 Similarly, the amount of filtering conducted by
private entities is limited. However, unlike governmental filtering that
is restricted by U.S. First Amendment doctrine, filtering conducted by
private entities has great potential to increase. Nonetheless, U.S. filtering efforts are unlikely to prompt a future WTO case, as the U.S.-Gambling Services Case was unique and is unlikely to be repeated.
A. INTERNET FILTERING TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED

BY THE

U.S.

Historically, the United States has opposed the regulation of the Internet and thus has not engaged in an extensive range of filtering activities. The U.S. government, in stark opposition to the approach of
European nations and the European Union, feared that Internet regulation would have a negative impact on the development of e-commerce,
ultimately harming the U.S. economy rather than benefitting it.125 As a
result, the majority of U.S. Internet filtering efforts have taken the form
of content regulations to address the problems associated with the distribution of child pornography and more general concerns about child protection, morality, national security, intellectual property, and computer
security.126
The U.S. has tended to rely more heavily on requesting the content
supplier to remove content rather than blocking users’ access to given
objectionable content.127 Moreover, U.S. Internet filtering efforts have
increasingly targeted the Internet’s crucial intermediaries to accomplish
their filtering, as evidenced by U.S. targeting of financial intermediaries
to limit access to foreign online gambling websites.128 This paper highlights four main efforts at Internet filtering that the U.S. has conducted
124. See supra Section IIB.
125. GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 27, at 40-42.
126. John G. Palfrey, Internet Filtering in the United States and Canada, in ACCESS
DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET FILTERING 226, 226 (Ronald
Diebert et al. eds., 2008).
127. GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 27, at 40-42.
128. Tom Newnham, WTO Case Study: United States – Measures Affecting the CrossBorder Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 7 ASPER. REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 77,
89 (2007) (citing Internet Gambling Prohibition and Enforcement Act, H.R. 4411, 109th
Cong. (2005). Although H.R. 4411 never passed, substantially similar provisions targeting
financial intermediaries were included in The Security and Accountability For Every Port
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in recent years, as efforts illustrative of the activities that are ongoing in
the United States.
The clearest example of U.S. Internet filtering conducted by the government is the forced installation of filtering software on computers in
public areas accessible to children in public libraries and public schools,
as required under the Children’s Internet Protection Act of 2000
(“CIPA”). Under CIPA, schools and libraries who want to receive discounts for computer equipment offered by the E-rate program129 must
agree to include filtering software on their computers that “block[s] or
filter[s] Internet access to pictures that are: (a) obscene, (b) child pornography, or (c) harmful to minors (for computers that are accessed by minors).”130 Hence, although this type of filtering is included as a licensing
requirement, it functions as direct content filtering for the user and is
subject to the same problems of over-breadth and under-breadth as all
Internet content filtering practices.
CIPA was challenged shortly after it was enacted. In 2001, the
American Library Association (“ALA”) in conjunction with the ACLU
successfully challenged CIPA before the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,131 but ultimately lost in 2003 before the Supreme Court.132 At
least one of the Justices, Justice Kennedy, believed that the key rationale for the Supreme Court’s decision to reverse the district court and
uphold the constitutionality of CIPA was the apparent ease with which
the filtering could be removed to facilitate use of the Internet by adults
for legitimate research purposes.133 This reveals how the U.S. approach
toward Internet filtering is tempered by concerns for First Amendment
rights that are less pronounced or non-existent in other nations that engage in more comprehensive filtering efforts, such as the European
Union member countries and China respectively.
Pennsylvania, like the federal government, has taken a stab at Internet filtering in much the same category of content. In February 2002,
Act of 2006. See The Security and Accountability For Every Port Act of 2006, 31 U.S.C.
§§ 5361–5367 (2010).
129. E-rate, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, http://www.fcc.gov/learnnet/ (last visited Feb. 2,
2011). The E-rate program was passed as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Id.
The program facilitates library and school access to affordable telecommunication equipment and more importantly Internet access. Id. The program is managed by the Universal
Service Administrative Company at the direction of the FCC. Id.
130. Children’s Internet Protection Act, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/
consumerfacts/cipa.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). Under the law, adult patrons using
computers with filtering technology installed my request the deactivation of the filtering
technology. Id. Furthermore, the law does not include any Internet use tracking requirements. Id.
131. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
132. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
133. Id. at 214-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Pennsylvania passed a law providing for censorship at the destination
ISP134 of illegal child pornography.135 The law requires:
An Internet service provider shall remove or disable access to child pornography items residing on or accessible through its service in a manner accessible to persons located within this Commonwealth within five
business days of when the Internet service provider is notified by the
Attorney General pursuant to subsection (g) that child pornography
items reside on or are accessible through its service.136

Initially, the law prompted some objections from ISPs on the basis
that they were unable to discriminate between Pennsylvania and nonPennsylvania users of their service and thus were forced to block noticed
content for all of their subscribers.137 Again, the Pennsylvania law demonstrates how content based filtering is often subject to problems of overbreadth. In this case the over-breadth stemmed from a lack of geographic specificity.
In 2003, Zittrain noted how one federal district court had already
struck down similar New York legislation on the basis that “the unique
nature of cyberspace necessitates uniform national treatment.”138 Indeed in 2004, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania considered Pennsylvania’s foray into Internet filtering and similarly declared the
Pennsylvania law unconstitutional.139 This ruling, however, may no
longer completely foreclose similar filtering efforts as the availability
and affordability of geolocation technology has increased dramatically
since 2004. To the extent that the district court found the law troublesome because the law had “the practical effect of exporting Pennsylvania’s domestic policies,”140 geolocation technology may cure that
problem. Nonetheless, advances in geolocation technologies will not
remedy concerns based on First Amendment arguments and the tendency of content-based regulations to block access to innocent as well as
the target websites.
The U.S. military also conducts Internet filtering. In August 2009,
the U.S. Marine Corps banned social networking sites.141 Based on limited information in the press, it seems that the ban will be enforced at
134. Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C L. REV. 653, 674 (2003) (noting China conducts much of its filtering via content filtering at the destination ISP).
135. Id.
136. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7330(a) (2002).
137. Zittrain, supra note 37 at 675-76.
138. Id. at 676 (quoting Am. Library Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 184 (S.D.N.Y.
1997)).
139. Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
140. Id. at 662.
141. 2009 Year in Review, OPENNET INITIATIVE, http://opennet.net/about-filtering/2009
yearinreview/# (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
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the destination ISP.142 The articulated rationale was security concerns
both on the operation side and in terms of computer security.143 Interestingly, the military has a far from uniform stance on social networking
sites and Web 2.0 applications, with the Army ordering all U.S. bases to
provide access to Facebook and the Defense Department considering a
department-wide ban on Web 2.0 sites.144
The most well-known instance of Internet filtering by the U.S. has
been government attempts to prevent U.S. residents from participating
in Internet gambling. This type of filtering was somewhat unique because it was accomplished not by blocking the Internet gambling websites themselves, but rather by targeting the financial intermediaries,
specifically credit card companies and banks that served the online gambling websites. Both Congress and individual states enacted laws to prevent financial intermediaries from doing business with the online
gambling companies.145 Targeting Internet intermediaries, through
which many Internet activities must pass, is likely to prove an increasingly fruitful means of accomplishing Internet filtering.
Other sporadic blocking appears to be taking place as well, although
finding out about it is somewhat luck of the draw. In late July, OpenNet
Initiative learned that AT&T had very briefly blocked access to
4chan.org for customers in Southern California.146 The ban allegedly
only lasted several hours and was reported on several social media sites,
such as Twitter and Reddit.147 At least one news source confirmed with
142. Noah Shachtman, Marines Ban Facebook, Twitter, Other Sites, CNN.COM (Aug. 4,
2009), http://edition.cnn.com/2009/TECH/08/04/marines.social.media.ban/index.html (noting that the ban will block the sites from U.S. Marine networks).
143. Id. at 143.
144. Id.
145. See e.g., Kiran S. Raj, Comment, Drawing a Line in the Sand: How the Federal
Government Can Work with the States to Regulate Internet Gambling, 56 EMORY L.J. 777,
789 (2006) (noting that the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5361
et seq. (2006), made “it illegal for a bank to process, and for any Internet gambling operator
to receive, funds in connection with gambling activities considered illegal under other federal or state laws”); Kevin F. King, Geolocation and Federalism on the Internet: Cutting
Internet Gambling’s Gordian Knot, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 41, 46 (2010) (noting
that enforcement of federal Internet gaming laws are “enforced via Department of Justice
investigations and Treasury Department regulations requiring banks to block transfers to
Internet gambling providers”); Prohibition on Funding of Unlawful Internet Gambling, 73
Fed. Reg. 69, 382 (Nov. 18, 2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 233; 31 C.F.R. pt. 132); Joel
D. Reidenberg, Current Debates in the Conflict of Laws: Choice of Law and Jurisdiction on
the Internet: Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1951, 1960 (2005)
(explaining New York’s successful campaign to stop banks from processing transfers to Internet gaming sites).
146. 2009 Year in Review, supra note 141.
147. Ben Parr, Report, AT&T Blocking 4chan, MASHABLE (July 26, 2009), http://mashable.com/2009/07/26/report-att-blocking-4chan/.
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AT&T that they were intentionally blocking the website.148 One plausible explanation for AT&T’s blocking of 4chan.org, stems from its notoriety for Internet pranks and hacking efforts.149 One report confirms this
explanation:
Beginning Friday, an AT&T customer was impacted by a denial-of-service attack stemming from IP addresses connected to img.4chan.org. To
prevent this attack from disrupting service for the impacted AT&T customer, and to prevent the attack from spreading to impact our other
customers, AT&T temporarily blocked access to the IP addresses in
question for our customers. This action was in no way related to the
content at img.4chan.org; our focus was on protecting our customers
from malicious traffic. Overnight Sunday, after we determined the denial-of-service threat no longer existed, AT&T removed the block on the
IP addresses in question. We will continue to monitor for denial-of-service activity and any malicious traffic to protect our customers.150

At this point, blocking by individual ISPs does not appear to be especially common. It is hard to speculate whether its use is likely to increase. Although United States First Amendment principles would not
govern filtering actions by private ISPs, unless conducted pursuant to
government direction, it seems unlikely that ISPs would resort to such
measures because the First Amendment is deeply ingrained in U.S.
culture.
B. U.S. FILTERING EFFORTS ARE UNLIKELY
VIOLATE GATS COMMITMENTS

TO

1. Nature of U.S. WTO GATS Commitments
The U.S. has made GATS commitments across most of the services
sectors. In the area of telecommunications services, which includes
many Internet based services and content, the U.S. imposes no significant market access restrictions for Mode 1 supply of telecommunications
services.151 Similarly, in the area of audiovisual services, the U.S. has
not imposed any significant market access restrictions.152 These categories would likely cover all future Internet filtering actions, with the exception of any future actions regarding online gambling, which would
again be classified under Recreational, Cultural, and Sporting Services.
148. David Murphy, AT&T Blocks 4chan, Stirs Internet Hornet’s Nest, PCWORLD (July
27, 2009), http://www.pcworld.com/article/169079/atandt_blocks_4chan_stirs_Internet_
hornets_nest.html (reporting that Centralgadget.com confirmed AT&T was “currently
blocking portions of the Internet site 4chan.org.”).
149. Parr, supra note 147.
150. Murphy, supra note 149.
151. United States’ Schedule of Specific Commitments under the General Agreement on
Trade in Services, S/DCS/W/USA (Feb. 27, 2003).
152. Id.
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However, the U.S. has revoked its commitments regarding sporting
services.153
2. Exceptions to GATS Commitments
The GATS Agreement allows countries to derogate from their market access commitments provided they satisfy certain guidelines set
forth under Article XIV. In U.S. – Gambling Services, the Appellate
Body interpreted the meaning of the exceptions found in Article XIV and
applied them in the gambling context. Specifically, Antigua had challenged the use of the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the Illegal Gambling
Business Act to prohibit online gambling providers located abroad from
providing their services within the United States. To test whether the
U.S. restrictions on Antiguan suppliers of gambling services were legal
the Appellate Body first looked to see whether the challenged measure
fell within the scope of paragraphs (a) – (e) of Article XIV which “requires
the challenged measure to address the particular interest specified in
that paragraph and that there be a sufficient nexus between the measure and the interest protected.”154 If the challenged measure provisionally satisfied that test, the Appellate Body examined whether the
measure complied with the chapeau’s requirement that the measure be
applied in a non-discriminatory manner to similarly situated
countries.155
With regard to the protection of public morals and the maintenance
of public order the Appellate Body held that the challenged measure
must be necessary to achieve the desired policy objective.156 To assess
whether a challenged measure is necessary the Appellate Body again
created a two-tiered test requiring the invoking Member to show that
“the policy objective pursued by the measure at issue is the protection of
public morals or the maintenance of public order; and the measure is
necessary to fulfil [sic] that policy objective.”157
The Panel decision dealt extensively with the meaning of public
morals and public order and was upheld but not discussed extensively by
the Appellate Body.158 The Panel concluded that Members had “some
scope to define and apply for themselves the concepts of ‘public morals’
and ‘public order’ in their respective territories, according to their own
153. Q&A on Impact of U.S. Compensation Offer in GATS Article XXI: Negotiations regarding Gambling Services on U.S. Laws and Regulations, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustraderep.gov/assets/Trade_Sectors/Services/asset_upload_file
515_15526.pdf.
154. U.S. – Gambling Services Panel Report, supra note 5.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 88.
158. U.S. – Gambling Services Panel Report, supra note 5.
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systems and scales of values.”159 Furthermore, the Panel accepted the
argument by the U.S. that Internet gambling posed risks to public
morals and public order in the form of organized crime, money laundering and fraud, risks to children, and risks to health from gambling
addiction.160
The Panel and the Appellate Body disagreed over the necessity element of the challenged measures. The Panel found that the U.S. had not
sufficiently demonstrated that the challenged measures were necessary,161 but the Appellate Body reversed that finding and instead held
that the challenged measures were necessary.162 The Appellate Body’s
holding rested on whether there were alternative measures “reasonably
available” that the U.S. had not pursued. Significantly, the Appellate
Body commented that “[a]n alternative measure may not be ‘reasonably
available,’ however, where it is merely theoretical in nature, for instance,
where the responding Member is not capable of taking it, of where the
measure imposes an undue burden on that Member, such as prohibitive
costs or substantial technical difficulties.” They went on to find that Antigua’s offer of consultations was not a measure ‘reasonably available’ to
the U.S. and thus that the three federal statutes satisfied the necessity
standard under Article XIV.163
However, the Appellate Body then went on to evaluate whether the
measures were consistent with the chapeau of Article XIV, which requires that the challenged measure be applied in a non-discriminatory
manner as to similarly situated countries. The Appellate Body upheld
the Panel’s findings that the provisions of the International Horseracing
Act discriminated between foreign and domestic service suppliers and
thus violated the chapeau of Article XIV.164 Specifically, the Appellate
Body noted that the International Horseracing Act authorized domestic
service suppliers, but not foreign service suppliers, to offer remote better
services and it was this differentiation in treatment in countries where
like conditions prevailed that violated the chapeau of Article XIV.165
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. U.S. – Gambling Services Panel Report, supra note 5. Additionally, after U.S. compliance with the Appellate Body’s decision was not forthcoming, Antigua requested the establishment of an Article 21.5 Panel. The Panel clarified the scope of the Appellate Body’s
decision stating that “the U.S. was not entitled to maintain its offending measures – the
Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the Illegal Gambling Business Act – under the ‘public morals’
exception.” Newnham, supra note 128, at 93-94.
165. U.S. – Gambling Services Panel Report, supra note 5.
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3. Current Filtering Efforts Do Not Violate U.S. GATS Commitments
Current U.S. filtering efforts, particularly those accomplished
through the FCC’s implementation of CIPA, are extremely unlikely to be
found in violation of U.S. commitments under the GATS Agreement.
The specific policy objectives pursued by CIPA are objectives explicitly
designed to protect the health and safety of children. Protecting the
health and safety of children categorically falls within the Panel’s definition of a public moral, which states public morals are “standards of right
and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation.”166 Additionally, preventing the dissemination of obscene material,
particularly child pornography, would also certainly fall within the
Panel’s articulation of the public order. Public order, according to the
Panel, means “the preservation of the fundamental interests of a society,
as reflected in public policy and law. These fundamental interests can
relate, inter alia, to standards of law, security and morality.”167 Furthermore, even though this would not be required under WTO GATS jurisprudence, practically speaking much of the underpinning for CIPA
stems from moral policy objectives that are accepted almost universally,
such as preventing children from being exposed to obscene or pornographic material, and as such would be unlikely to draw objection from
other countries.
A second reason that U.S. filtering efforts are unlikely to violate
GATS commitments lies in the fact that U.S. commitments to the WTO
under the GATS Agreement are significantly less stringent than the
level of review imposed by U.S. courts under First Amendment principles. Practices that could potentially violate WTO Commitments would
almost always be found in violation of the First Amendment and halted
before a WTO challenge was mounted. First Amendment principles operate as an important restriction on the scope of U.S. Internet filtering
both in terms of legal limitations and social limitations. As a result of
U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence, more extreme types of Internet filtering have not taken place in the U.S. and nor are they likely to develop
in the future.168 For example, states, such as Pennsylvania, have tried
to regulate Internet content within their state have had their regulations
struck down as unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds. Finally,
the CIPA filtering blocks all websites equally and does not discriminate
based on the source of the content, unlike the challenged U.S. gambling
regulations.169
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id.
GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 27, at 40-42; Palfrey, supra note 233.
Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 666. (E.D. Pa. 2004).
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Recently, at least one prominent U.S. company, Google, has come
out publicly and strongly against Internet filtering. On March 24, 2010,
Google executive, Alan Davidson, speaking before the Congressional Executive on China, commented on the threat Internet filtering posed to
international trade.170 Google supported its rhetoric against filtering by
leaving the Chinese market and closing its previously censored search
site Google.cn as of March 22, 2010.171 With such prominent companies,
especially ones that are well positioned to carry out Internet filtering,
coming out against Internet censorship, it seems unlikely that the U.S.
would suddenly decide to increase its own filtering efforts, as other nations like Australia have recently chosen to do.172
4. The U.S.-Gambling Services Case Was Unique and is Unlikely to
be Repeated
The U.S.–Gambling Services case was unique in two important respects: (1) it concerned the importation of a service, Internet gambling,
when the U.S. is predominantly an exporter of services rather than an
importer, and (2) the U.S.-Gambling Services decision resulted from a
complete denial of market access in a given sector, whereas the limited
filtering conducted by the U.S. outside of that conducted under the FCC’s
implementation of CIPA does not cause a complete denial of market
access.
First, the U.S. is predominantly an exporter of services.173 Although the U.S. does import a considerable amount of services “the
United States continues to maintain the largest services trade surplus of
any country in the world” demonstrating that its services exports far exceed its imports as compared to other countries.174 Specifically, in 2007,
service exports reached $480 billion while imports totaled $341.1 billion,
creating the largest services trade surplus in U.S. history and that the
world has seen.175
Although the U.S. has yet to collect data specifically addressing the
trade in e-services there is no reason to believe this correlation is any
170. Javier C. Hernandez, Google Official Calls for Action on Web Limits, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 24, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/25/technology/25google.html?hpw.
171. Miguel Helft & David Baroza, Google Shuts China Site in Dispute Over Censorship,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/23/technology/23google.html.
172. Green Light for Internet Filter Plans, ABC NEWS, (Dec. 15, 2009), http://www.abc.
net.au/news/stories/2009/12/15/2772467.htm (announcing that Australia will introduce
compulsory Internet filtering to block overseas sites which contain criminal content such as
child pornography and sexual violence).
173. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, RECENT TRENDS IN U.S. SERVICES TRADE 2009 ANNUAL
REPORT xi (2009), available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4084.pdf.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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less true for e-services than it is for traditional services. Indeed, if anything, the correlation is probably stronger in the realm of e-services as
the U.S. provides most of the Internet’s major e-service providers such as
Google, Wikipedia, Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, and many of the most
popular blog hosting sites. In the U.S.– Gambling Services case the U.S.
found itself in the somewhat unique position of importing an Internet
service: Internet gambling. Given language barriers between the U.S.
and other prominent software producers, combined with the already
prominent position of U.S. companies in most e-service arenas, it seems
unlikely that the U.S. will find itself an importer of a similarly lucrative
service as Internet gambling.
Second, the U.S.-Gambling Services case was unique because U.S.
Internet filtering efforts, directed at financial intermediaries, resulted in
a near total denial of market access by services from a specific foreign
country.176 Currently, no filtering efforts by the U.S. government create
a similarly extensive market access barrier in a given sector. Even in
those sectors of Internet where the U.S. government imposes the most
stringent controls, i.e. in the arena of access by minors to obscene materials, access is only limited in public school and libraries that wish to receive E-rate funding.177 The barrier to market access is far from
complete. Children can still access obscene materials at home, in Internet cafes, and on computers at public schools and libraries that prefer
not to censor the Internet in exchange for discounted access to technology. Furthermore, the FCC does not require participation in the E-rate
program.178 As a result, the rarity of the circumstances that led to the
U.S.-Gambling Services decisions combined with the entrenched and
growing resistance to Internet filtering in the U.S. in all but the most
universally accepted arenas, suggests that the U.S. is unlikely to find
itself in violation of e-commerce related GATS commitments again.
Furthermore, the U.S.-Gambling Services case was unique because
a regulation specifically prohibited the provision of a service by a foreign
176. Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General, Ten Banks End Online
Gambling with Credit Cards, (Feb. 11, 2003), http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2003/feb/
feb11b_03.htmlhttp://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/feb/feb11b 03.html (Spitzer commenting that “[t]The vast majority of credit card issuers – and all issuers doing significant
business with New York consumers – have now recognized their legal, ethical, and business obligation to block credit card transactions identified as online gambling.”).
177. The E-Rate: an Overview, EDUC. & LIBRARY NETWORKS COALITION, http://www.ed
linc.org/get_facts.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2011) (showing which schools and libraries and
what services are being funded by the E-rate and indicating the level of participation in the
E-rate program by state).
178. E-Rate Program Discounted Telecommunications Services, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oii/nonpublic/erate.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2011)
(“Non-profit private schools — along with public schools, and libraries — can receive discounted telecommunications services through the E-rate program.”) (emphasis added).
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supplier while allowing domestic suppliers access to the market. Given
the limited nature of U.S. filtering efforts combined with the fact that
most services are supplied by U.S. suppliers, this situation is not likely
to repeat itself. For example, in the case where the U.S. Marine Corps
has chosen to block access to social media sites, GATS commitments
would not be applicable because the service targeted is a domestically
supplied service and there is no disparate treatment on the basis of country of origin of the service. While the situation is somewhat more complicated when one considers AT&T’s blocking of 4chan.org because AT&T
was blocking a foreign website, it would nonetheless be difficult for
4chan.org to show that AT&T would not behave in a similar fashion if a
U.S. based website began sending denial of service attacks to its
customers.
Given that U.S. Commitments made under the GATS Agreement
are unlikely to provide successful remedies for any sporadic filtering efforts that the U.S. might elect to engage in, what remedies could potential victims pursue? For filtering against U.S. based service suppliers,
the best remedies are likely to be found in tort law.
V. TORT REMEDIES
Given that the WTO GATS Agreement is unlikely to provide effective remedies for those feeling the effects of Internet filtering, those affected must look elsewhere to protect their business interests. And while
the U.S. government is not likely to become increasingly involved in content filtering because of First Amendment concerns among others, the
potential for U.S. companies to filter the Internet as appliancization of
the Internet increases is growing. One potential avenue for effective
remedies to Internet filtering conducted by private actors is found in
common law tort doctrine, specifically the tort of intentional interference
with contractual relations and at-will relations.
A. INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH AN EXISTING CONTRACT
To see how the tort of intentional interference with contractual relations would apply in the Internet filtering context, imagine a situation in
which an ISP chooses to block Skype services, while allowing its own
proprietary version of VoIP software to flow unimpeded to its subscribers.179 This class of situation seems increasingly likely to occur in light
179. It is important to note that in this example the entity doing the Internet filtering is
a private entity rather than the U.S. government. Also, the private entity is not filtering at
the direction of the U.S. government but rather to serve its own private ends. As such,
concerns of government immunity are not implicated.
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of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Comcast Corp. v. FCC.180 That case
arose out of Comcast’s network management policies that blocked subscribers from sharing files using peer-to-peer network applications, such
as BitTorrent, eDonkey and Gnutella.181 The D.C. Circuit held that the
FCC does not have the authority to regulate an ISPs network management policies, as they pertain to blocking customers use of peer-to-peer
network applications.182 Thus, at least as the law stands now, the FCC
is largely powerless to stop ISPs from blocking content, provided it is
justified as necessary for network management.183
Most states recognize the common law tort of intentional interference with an existing contract as well as a tort for interference with prospective business relationships.184 The Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 766 defines intentional interference with the performance of a contract
by a third person as:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance
of a contract (except a contract to marry) between another and a third
person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform
the contract, is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss
resulting to the other from the failure of the third person to perform the
contract.185

Applying the language of the Restatement to the Skype scenario
above the ISP would be the party interfering with the performance of a
contract between Skype and the consumer of Skype services who is also
an ISP subscriber. Thus, in order to be found liable the consumer would
need to show that the ISP acted both “intentionally” and “improperly.”
The first prong of the test, intentionality, is not hard to satisfy. All
that is required under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A is that the
defendant had the purpose to cause the consequences of his act or the
180. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, No. 08-1291, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7039 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 6,
2010).
181. Peter Svensson, Comcast Blocks Some Internet Traffic: Tests Confirm Data Discrimination by Number 2 U.S. Service Provider, MSNBC.COM (Oct. 19, 2007, 9:36 AM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21376597/ns/technology_and_science-internet/.
182. Comcast Corp., 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7039 at 54.
183. While this decision is unlikely to be the final word on the FCC’s ability to regulate
ISPs network management policies, it is worth noting that this challenge alone took approximately two and a half years to resolve; during which time the company’s whose Internet traffic was being blocked would suffer substantial economic harm if a preliminary
injunction was not obtained.
184. See e.g., DAN B. DOBBS & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED
TORTS: ECONOMIC AND DIGNITARY TORTS BUSINESS, COMMERCIAL AND INTANGIBLE HARMS,
369-70 (2006); James O. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Liability for Interference with At Will
Business Relationship, 5 A.L.R. FED. 9 (2010); Joel E. Smith, Liability of Third Party for
Interference with Prospective Contractual Relationship Between Two Other Parties, 6 A.L.R.
FED. 195 (2010).
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (emphasis added).
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defendant believed that the consequences of his act were substantially
certain to follow. Courts applying this standard have rejected the argument that only a purpose or desire to cause interference is sufficient to
meet the intentionality requirement.186
To satisfy the intentionality standard it is necessary to prove the
ISP had knowledge of the contractual relationship.187 In order to successfully block Skype packets, the ISP has to inspect the packets being
transmitted to determine they are Skype packets. Thus, it is reasonable
to assume that there would not be Skype packets being transmitted unless there was a contractual relationship.
It was not always the case that the plaintiff was required to show
both intentionality and impropriety. Historically, it was sufficient for a
third-party to prove intentional interference.188 Currently, the Restatement and courts have indicated that certain interferences in contractual
relations are justifiable and thus privileged.189 Moreover, courts are increasingly placing the burden of showing improper interference on
plaintiffs.190
The second prong of the test, the improper interference element, is
not as easily satisfied as the intentionality standard. It is easier to make
the improper showing if the act of interfering with the contract also violates a pre-existing independent duty, such as a tort duty or fiduciary
duty.191 For example, in Northeast Women’s Center, Inc. v. McMonagle,
plaintiff, a women’s health center, sued defendants, anti-abortion protestors, for intentional interference in contractual relations and civil RICO
violations.192 The court held that the RICO statute applied to the
protesters intimidating behavior and used the evidence of RICO violations as evidence that the protestors had violated an independent duty,
thereby satisfying the improper element of the intentional interference
in contractual relations claim.193
However, in the context of Internet filtering it is unlikely that an
ISP will have committed an independent tort. Consequently, plaintiffs
must show that the ISPs actions were wrongful, either in terms of their
186. Kor. Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 949-50 (Cal. 2003).
187. DOBBS & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, supra note 184, at 370-72.
188. Lumley v. Gye, (1853) 118 Eng. Rep. 749.
189. DOBBS & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, supra note 184, at 370.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 374 (citing Ne. Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v. Harris, 661 A.2d 1146 (Me. 1995);
Ne. Women’s Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1989)).
192. Ne. Women’s Ctr., 868 F.2d at 1345.
193. Id. at 1347-48 (noting that the plaintiffs “pleaded and proved that Defendants embarked on a willful campaign to use fear, harassment, intimidation and force against the
Center through targeting its employees so that they would, and some did, sever their employment at the Center.”).
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motive or means, even though no pre-existing duty was violated.194
Wrongful motive or means is an amorphous standard, but one court has
commented that “[i]mproper means includes not only tortious behavior,
but any ‘predatory’ behavior, including behavior that is wrongful based
on an established standard of a trade or profession.”195
A plaintiff could argue that Internet filtering that violates the principle of net neutrality violates an established standard of Internet conduct. Net neutrality is generally understood to mean a “mandate . . .
prohibit[ing] network owners from discriminating against particular applications and content providers.”196 Thus, net neutrality would prohibit
an ISP from prioritizing its VoIP service over Skype. This line of argument would satisfy the requirement that the action satisfied the wrongful motive or means requirement of the improper interference element of
the tort of intentional interference in contractual relations.
If the Internet filtering was not discriminatory in nature between
services of a similar nature, a plaintiff could still succeed on an interference in contractual relations theory if they could satisfy the multifactor
test applied by courts to determine whether the interference was
“improper:”
(a) the nature of the actor’s conduct, (b) the actor’s motive, (c) the interests of the other which with the actor’s conduct interferes, (d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor, (e) the social interests in
protecting the freedom of action of the other, (f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s conduct to the interference, and (g) the relations
between the parties.197

A secondary question is whether actual breach of the contract is
even required for a potential plaintiff to succeed. This is relevant in the
Internet filtering context because often content will not be 100% blocked.
It is not necessary to block content 100% of the time in order for Internet
filtering to be effective.198 Imagine a scenario in which an ISP instead of
blocking Skype traffic just slowed Skype traffic down considerably.
Would that kind of filtering still be actionable as a common law tort?
Although less widely accepted than § 766, § 766A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts on Intentional Interference with Another’s Performance of His Own Contract provides that actual breach is not required for
a potential plaintiff to succeed. The Restatement only requires that the
194. DOBBS & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, supra note 184, at 374.
195. Bogle v. Summit Inv. Co., LLC, 107 P.3d 520, 528-29(N.M. Ct. App. 2005).
196. Tim Wu & Christopher Yoo, Keeping the Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu and Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575, 575 (2007).
197. DOBBS & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, supra note 184, at 374 (citing Hill v. Winnebago Industries, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 326, 328-29 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994)).
198. GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 27, at 67.
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performance be made “to be more expensive or burdensome.”199
To date, this author has only found one case where the plaintiff has
successfully pled intentional interference in contractual relations in the
Internet filtering context: CAT Internet Services, Inc. v. Magazines.com
Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2001).200 In CAT the
plaintiff and defendant were Internet and e-commerce companies with
interests in domain names that were very similar to one another: the
plaintiff owned and operated www.magazine.com (singular), while the
defendant owned and operated www.magazines.com (plural).201 The
plaintiff’s website marketed electronic magazines, but at approximately
the same time as suit was brought, the plaintiff was in the process of
entering into agreements with third-parties, such as E-News and Magazine Mall, to market conventional magazines.202 The defendant’s website had always marketed conventional magazines.203 The law suit
originated when plaintiff discovered that the defendant was utilizing
plaintiff’s domain name to redirect traffic to its own website.204 Among
other claims the plaintiff brought a claim alleging both interference with
contractual relations and interference with prospective contractual
relations.205
The court considered both the prospective and actual contractual relations claims.206 With regard to the prospective contractual relationship the court found that the plaintiff had produced sufficient evidence to
survive the motion to dismiss.207 The court stated that the plaintiff had
sufficient “evidence of a prospective contractual relation between Plaintiff and E-News, Magazine Mall, and other parties, intent by the Defendant to harm the Plaintiff by preventing these relationships from
occurring in the absence of a privilege or justification, and the occurrence
of $100,000 in damages to the Plaintiff as a result.”208 Applying the
199. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766A (1979).
200. See generally Vulcan Golf, LLC v. Google Inc., 552 F. Supp. 2d 752 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
The plaintiffs pled intentional interference in current business relationship but did not
provide any facts establishing the existence of a contract so the court treated the claim as
one for intentional interference in prospective business relationship, which is addressed in
the next section. Id.
201. CAT Internet Servs. Inc. v. Magazines.com Inc., No. 00-2135, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2001).
202. Id. at *2-3.
203. Id.
204. Id. at *3. The opinion does not provide any detail regarding how the defendant was
able to redirect the Internet traffic, stating only that the plaintiff “discovered that the Defendant was utilizing CAT’s domain name to redirect Internet traffic to Defendant’s web
site.” Id. The pleadings are not available electronically through PACER.
205. Id. at *8.
206. Id. at *8-9.
207. CAT Internet Servs. Inc. v. Magazines.com Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8, at *10-11.
208. Id. at *11 (internal citations omitted).
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same reasoning, the court found that the plaintiff’s claim for interference
in contractual relations also survived the motion to dismiss.209
The CAT case demonstrates that courts are willing to apply the tort
of interference in contractual relations to the Internet filtering context.
The parties in the CAT case could easily be substituted such that the
plaintiff was Skype, the defendant the preferentially blocking ISP, and
the third-party was the Skype customers rather than E-News and Magazine Mall. Such a substitution illustrates that such cases, if properly
pled, can survive the motion to dismiss stage and constitute at least a
colorable claim for relief. However, the case did not proceed to trial. The
case was dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)
approximately three months prior to its scheduled trial date.210
One other case, Verizon Advanced Data, Inc. v. Frognet, Inc.,211 further demonstrates that plaintiffs will likely be able to succeed on interference in contractual relation claims in the context of the Internet, even
if they are only able to present circumstantial evidence to satisfy the improper element of the tort. Verizon supplied Internet bandwidth to
FrogNet under a contract. In late 2002, Verizon told FrogNet that it
could no longer add new customers unless it made certain equipment
upgrades. As a result of this action FrogNet claimed it lost 180 customers and brought claims against Verizon for intentional interference with
its business relationship with those customers.212 Verizon moved for
summary judgment on that claim, but the court rejected Verizon’s motion.213 The court specifically noted that FrogNet had provided substantial circumstantial evidence showing that “Verizon may have been
attempting to keep FrogNet from growing while another Verizon entity –
Verizon Online – was about to begin providing DSL service,”214 which
satisfied the requirement that the interference be improper.
Conversely, in Asch Webhosting, Inc. v. Adelphia Business Solutions
Investment, LLC,215 the Third Circuit found that the plaintiff’s circum209. Id. at *14 (citing the same factors for the actual contractual relationship as it did
for the prospective contractual relationship).
210. It appears the case was dismissed because the plaintiff’s insurance company
stopped paying to prosecute the case. CAT Internet Servs.Inc. v. Providence Wash.Ins. Co.,
333 F.3d 138, 140 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining that after CAT was sued in Tennessee by
Magazines.com, CAT’s “insurers, Providence Washington and York, declined to undertake
their defense under the advertising injury provisions of their standard commercial liability
policies.”).
211. Verizon Advanced Data, Inc. v. Frognet, Inc., No. 2:05-cv-955, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 32595 (E.D. Oh. Apr. 2, 2010).
212. Id. at *8-9.
213. Id. at *24.
214. Id. at *10.
215. Asch Webhosting, Inc. v. Adelphia Business Solutions Inv., LLC, No. 09-2296, 2010
U.S. App. LEXIS 1546 (3d Cir. Jan. 25, 2010).
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stantial evidence was lacking. Asch purchased Internet bandwidth from
Adelphia under a contract that was later terminated by Adelphia, after
Adelphia received complaints about e-mails emanating from Asch’s IP
addresses.216 Asch sued Adelphia for intentional interference with contractual relations.217 The Third Circuit upheld the district court’s grant
of summary judgment in favor of Adelphia finding that there was no interference.218 However, in finding in favor of the defendant, the Third
Circuit relied on an exculpatory clause in the contract between Asch and
Adelphia that released Adelphia from “all liability or responsibility for
any direct, indirect, incidental or consequential damages, suffered by
[Asch] in connection with [its] use of or inability to use the [Adelphia]
internet services.”219
In its reasoning, the Third Circuit commented on the standard necessary to prove predatory behavior, which is one of the ways a plaintiff
may satisfy the “improper” element of the tort. Asch argued that Adelphia’s breach of contract was predatory and pointed to e-mails implying
that Adelphia had breached the contract to ensure Asch did not increase
the number of IP addresses it required.220 Rejecting Asch’s argument,
the Third Circuit said “Asch [had] not presented evidence suggesting
that [Adelphia] had a reason, other than the explanations it gave [concerning the complaints related to Asch’s IP addresses], for terminating
its services to a paying client.”221 Had Asch presented a more complete
allegation that Adelphia’s breach of contract was explicitly to prevent
Asch’s growth, as FrogNet did, it seems possible that the Third Circuit
would have found Adelphia’s actions constituted predatory behavior.
Hence, the Third Circuit’s decision in Asch Webhosting does not preclude
recovery for intentional interference in contractual relations, as Asch did
not present sufficient circumstantial evidence of improper action on the
part of Adelphia.
VI. INTERFERENCE WITH AT-WILL RELATIONSHIPS
What happens in those cases where there is no contractual relationship, such as in the case where a website that doesn’t provide a contractual service, but merely provides content, is simply blocked as a result of
Internet filtering? This situation appears to fit within the tort of interference with an at-will relationship, which is almost universally ac216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id. at *2.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *6 (emphasis added).
Id. at *7.
Asch Webhosting, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 1546 at *7.
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cepted.222 The tort requires proof of the following elements: “the
existence of a business relationship or expectancy, it often being stated
that an existing contract is not required; knowledge by the interferer of
the relationship or expectancy; an intentional act of interference; proof
that the interference caused the harm sustained; and damage to the
plaintiff.”223 Once the plaintiff establishes the required elements the
burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that his or her actions
were justified.224
At least one case, in Illinois, has considered the tort of interference
with an at-will business relationship in the Internet context. In Vulcan
Golf, LLC v. Google Inc.,225 the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant’s
registered domain names that are the same or substantially similar to
plaintiff’s distinctive trade names and marks. The defendants behaved
this way in order to generate advertising revenues at the expense of the
plaintiffs. When an Internet user, upon seeing the similar domain name,
became confused and selected the wrong website, the defendants generated ad revenue.226 The plaintiff further alleged that Google partnered
with the defendants, who have hundreds of similar domain names under
its control, by helping the defendants select and place ads on the similar
domains.227
Although the court has yet to reach a complete resolution of the case,
the court has denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the intentional
interference with prospective business advantage claim. The court rejected the defendants’ position that the plaintiffs failed to assert “a business expectancy with a specific third-party as well as particular action by
the defendant directed towards that third-party” because the plaintiffs’
contention that they “would have done business with a third-party class
of “Internet users/consumers” [was] too conclusory” to “raise the plaintiffs’ right to relief above the speculative level.”228 Instead, the court
found that “identification of general classes of third-parties (here, Internet users) can be sufficient” to survive a motion to dismiss because
“[t]he court is simply not willing at the motion to dismiss stage to definitively state that such a showing, while likely a daunting task, is impossible such that the plaintiffs cannot state a claim.”229
222. James O. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Liability for Interference with At Will Business
Relationship, 5 A.L.R. FED. 9 at §2[a] (2010).
223. Id. (internal citations omitted).
224. Id.
225. Vulcan Golf, LLC v. Google, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 2d 752 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
226. Id. at 759-60.
227. Id. at 760.
228. Id. at 760, 781.
229. Id. at 781 (citing Cook v. Winfrey, 141 F.3d 322, 328 (7th Cir. 1998)).
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The Seventh Circuit has previously held, in the non-Internet context, that under Illinois law it is sufficient for a plaintiff to identify a
“class” of third-parties with whom he or she might have had a prospective business relationship, rather than a specific single third-party.230
In Cook v. Winfrey, the plaintiff sued Oprah Winfrey for interfering with
his ability to publish tabloid stories regarding her alleged drug abuse.231
The plaintiff identified “the media” as the third-party class with whom
he had a prospective business relationship and the Seventh Circuit, reversing the district court’s ruling, found that this was more than is required under notice pleading standards and thus sufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss.232 Consequently, it seems possible that given the
right evidence a plaintiff could win on the basis of intentional interference with a prospective business advantage claim, even if the plaintiff
could do no more than identify a class of prospective customers, such as
Internet users.
VII. CONCLUSION
Internet filtering is a growing concern worldwide. The number of
countries filtering the Internet has increased from “a handful” just under
a decade ago to approximately 40 in 2010.233 While actors in the United
States do not carry out extensive content based Internet filtering, they
do engage in some actions, such as AT&T’s recent blocking of 4chan.org.
The potential for ISPs to impose restrictions on services such as VoIP
phone service or for cell phones carriers to restrict the ways in which
phones can browse the Internet is ever present, and growing if one accepts Zittrain’s appliancization theory.
The remedies available under the WTO GATS Agreement are, however, unlikely to be available or effective for U.S. actors’ future attempts
at Internet filtering. The U.S.-Gambling Services decision, in which the
U.S. was found in violation of its WTO GATS Commitments, is unlikely
to be repeated in part because of the limited amount of nationality based
discriminatory filtering the U.S. government conducts and in part because of the unique circumstances that combined in the U.S.-Gambling
230. Cook v. Winfrey, 141 F.3d 322, 328 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing River Park, Inc. v. City of
Highland Park, 667 N.E.2d 499, 507 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. City
of Darien, 357 N.E.2d 211, 214, (Ill. App. Ct. 1976)).
231. Cook, 141 F.3d at 324.
232. Id. at 328.
233. Javier C. Hernandez, Google Official Calls for Action on Web Limits, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 24, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/25/technology/25google.html?hpw; Google
and Internet Control in China: A Nexus Between Human Rights and Trade?: Hearing
Before the Cong.-Exec. Comm’n on China, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Alan Davidson,
Director of Public Policy, Google Inc.), available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/hearings/
2010/20100324/davidsonTestimony.pdf?PHPSESSID=1e18ee1fbf60adabafcd336342f0235e.
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Services case. As a result, those facing the effects of filtering by private
actors would likely have more success by pursuing common law tort remedies, such as intentional interference in a contractual relationship or
intentional interference in an at-will relationship. In the context of contractual relationships, a growing body of precedent suggests that claims
for interference in contractual relations as a result of Internet filtering
are at least colorable claims, if not likely to be successful ultimately. Additionally, at least one court has considered this tort in the context of a
prospective at-will relationship and found that alleging harm to a class
of third-party users consisting of Internet users is sufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss; however, whether further success is possible remains
to be tested.

